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PAINE, WEBBER, JACKSON AND CURTIS, INC. V.
MERRILL

L YNCH

PIERCE, FENNER &

SMITH: METHODS OF DOING BUSINESS
HELD PATENTABLE BECAUSE
IMPLEMENTED ON A COMPUTERt
It is difficult to overstate the impact of computers on modern society. Originally a tool of the research scientist, computers are now
a regular feature of daily life. In the home, business, manufacturing,
education, and medicine, computers have taken over dull repetitive
tasks, as well as making possible other tasks thought impractical a
generation ago. 1
Central to the growth in utilization of computers has been the
willingness of industry to invest in the creation of the software necessary to bring these machines to life. Development of sophisticated software requires many hours of work by computer
programmers. 2 With the growing market for computer software, the
importance of protecting this investment will undoubtedly increase. 3
There are three bodies of law that can be used to prevent unauthorized use of computer software: trade secret, copyright, and patent law. Since the software industry is still comparatively young,
there has been little development of case law applicable to the
unique problems presented by software. This is particularly true in
patent law. Although an appellate court first held that computer
software could be patented in 1968, 4 private litigants have only recently contested the validity of a patent obtained for a software int This student Note was awarded National Third Place in the Computer/Law
Journal's First Annual Computer Law Writing Contest.
1. In 1983, TIME magazine featured the computer as its "man of the year" for
1982 and discussed the growing role of computers in industry and the home. Man of
the Year, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 52.

2. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978). See also, Note, An Anomaly in the Patent System: The Uncertain Status of Computer Software, 8 RUTGERS J.

COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 273, 276-80 (1982).
3. See REMER, LEGAL CARE FOR YOUR SOFTWARE (1982) (discussion of the need
for protection of software as well as applicable legal doctrines). See also Note, supra
note 2, at 276.
4. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
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vention. 5 The case law in this area has heretofore resulted from
litigation between prospective patentees and the Patent and Trademark Office.
Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code 6 sets out those
classes of invention for which a patent may be obtained and has
been the primary focus of disputes in the software area. In its most
recent decision construing section 101, the Supreme Court declared
that a claim for an invention utilizing a digital computer for one or
more steps of a claimed process is statutory, provided the process is
7
of the type that section 101 was intended to protect.
But suppose that a nonstatutory invention is implemented on a
computer. Is such an invention patentable under section 101? This
question was presented to the District Court of Delaware in Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.8 In a suit for declaratory judgment, plaintiff Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. (Paine, Webber) challenged the validity
of the patent obtained by defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) on its Cash Management Account. The
court held that the claims recited patentable subject matter because
they taught a method of operating a computer. 9
This Note criticizes the analysis used by the District Court. The
main premise of the Note is that the Paine, Webber decision sidesteps issues requiring analysis under the most recent appellate
court decisions in the software area. In addition, an approach to
these omitted issues is suggested.
First, the facts of the case and a summary of the reasoning relied on by the court are discussed. Second, the legal background of
the decision is explored, with particular attention paid to the devel5. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) is the first reported case in which private
litigants disputed the validity of a patent on a software invention. But see Arshal v.
United States, 621 F.2d 421 (Ct. Cl. 1980), where a patentee sued the government for
infringing his patent. While the government is obviously not a private litigant, the
style of the action in Arshal resembles an infringement suit between private parties.
Paine, Webber is also the first reported decision concerning the validity of a software
patent by a district court.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are
to title 35 of the United States Code.
7. "A claim drawn to subject matter, otherwise statutory, does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses ... a digital computer." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 187 (1981). If a patent claim involves an invention that falls within § 101, it is said
to recite statutory subject matter. The requirements of § 101 are discussed in greater
detail at in fra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
8. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
9. Id. at 1369.

1984]

PATENTABLE COMPUTER BUSINESS METHODS

103

opment of present judicial views concerning the patentability of
software. Third, the rationale for the court's holding is critically
evaluated. The analysis relied on by the trial court is compared with
that applied by the Supreme Court and by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). This Note argues that the court correctly perceived that the disputed claims were drawn to a computer
algorithm, but that the court's analysis of patentability was superficial. The court should not have held that the claims recited statutory subject matter simply because the claimed invention was
implemented on a computer. Rather, the appropriate question was
whether or not the steps of the claimed algorithm embodied a process that complied with the statutory requirements.
I. PAINE, WEBBER FACTS AND REASONING
In 1980 Merrill Lynch filed a patent application covering its then
recently introduced Cash Management Account (CMA), entitled
"Securities Brokerage-Cash Management System." 10 As disclosed
in the patent, the invention incorporated a combination of a conventional securities account providing for full value and margin
purchases, a choice of short-term investments, and a credit account
with both checking and charge account privileges. Merril Lynch
contended that by combining these three components, all of which
were previously known, into a single account, synergistic effects accrued to the benefit of each customer. As an example, Merill Lynch
pointed to the purchase of interest-bearing mutual fund shares with
the cash resulting from transactions in the securities account." In
the ordinary securities account, uninvested capital resulting from
market transactions lies idle, earning neither interest nor dividends.
Plaintiff Paine, Webber attacked the validity of Merrill Lynch's
United States Patent 4,346,442 (the '442 patent). In a motion for
summary judgment, Paine, Webber argued that the '442 patent was
for a method of doing business, and was therefore not statutory subject matter under section 101 of the patent laws. 12 In support of its
motion, Paine, Webber cited a line of cases assertedly holding that
methods of doing business were not patentable subject matter.13
10. Id. at 1363. United States Patent 4,346,442 was issued to Thomas E. Musmanno on August 24, 1982. It was assigned on that date to Merrill Lynch.
11. Id. at 1361 (citing docket item 13A, CMA Money Trust Prospectus, at 2).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1365. The list included: Loew's Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949); In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (C.C.P.A. 1942); Hotel
Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908); Berardini v. Tocci, 190
F. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 200 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1912); United States Credit System
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The challenged claims 14 were directed to a method or system of
doing business. However, each claim was limited to a means (e.g., a
computer) for carrying out the claimed method. 15 Merrill Lynch argued that such claiming was authorized by section 112 as "means
Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 53 F. 818 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 59 F. 139 (2d Cir.
1893). Id.
Examination of these cases reveals that the issue of patentable subject matter
was never actually decided. Rather, the patent claims were held invalid for "lack of
invention." See, e.g., Loew's, 174 F.2d at 553. The issue of the patentability of a
method of doing business was discussed only in dictum, id. at 552. See also,
Hansman, Method of Doing Business, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 503, 504 (1968), (stating
that: "except for dicta, one can conclude that there is no basis in existing law for the
rejection of claims as being directed to a 'method for doing business' "). Contra PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT

Ex-

AMINING PROCEDURE, §706.03(a) (4th ed. 1979) ("[t]hough seemingly within the
category of a process or method, a method of doing business can be rejected as not
being within the statutory classes.").
14. Claim 1, which is representative, recites:
In combination in a system for processing and supervising a plurality of
composite subscriber accounts each comprising a margin brokerage account,
a charge card and checks administered by a first institution, and participation
in at least one short term investment, administered by a second institution,
said system including brokerage account data file means for storing current
information characterizing each subscriber margin brokerage account of the
second institution, manual entry means for entering short term investment
orders in the second institution, data receiving and verifying means for receiving and verifying charge card and check transactions from said first institution and short term investment orders from said manual entry means,
means responsive to said brokerage account data fie means and said data receiving and verifying means for generating an updated credit limit for each
account, short term investment updating means responsive to said brokerage
account data fie means and said data receiving and verifying means for selectively generating short term investment transactions as required to generate and invest proceeds for subscribers' accounts, wherein said system
includes plural such short term investments, said system further comprising
means responsive to said short term updating means for allocating said short
term investment transactions among said plural short term investments,
communicating means to communicate said updated credit limit for each account to said first institution.
United States Patent Number 4,346,442.
15. For example, claim I is restricted to "brokerage account file means" and
"manual entry means for entering short term investment orders." Id. In the language
of patent claims, the term "means" connotes an apparatus or machine. By referring
to "means for" a function or step, this claim element is restricted to a machine or apparatus for accomplishing the described step.
When a patent claim recites a sequence of steps without limitation to "means
for," the patent is said to read on a process or method. This can be a broader way in
which to claim an invention, since the sequence of steps is claimed, no matter how
carried out. In the case of a software invention, the distinction between "means for"
and method claims may disappear, since the method is to be carried out by only one
means: a computer programmed according to the patented invention. In other technical areas, the distinction between means and method claims can be much greater.
See In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 37 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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plus function language."' 6
The court held that, for a section 101 analysis, it was irrelevant
whether a patent claim was in method or apparatus (means) form.
Rather, the question was whether or not the subject matter was patentable, regardless of the label of the claims. 17 In the court's view,
the claims were drawn to a computer algorithm: a step-by-step logical method for solving a complex problem. 18
Evaluating the claims in the '442 patent, the Paine, Webber court
held that it had "carefully examined the claims in the case and
[was] unable to find any direct or indirect recitation of a procedure
for solving a mathematical problem. Rather, the patent allegedly
claims a methodology for effecting a highly efficient business system." 9 Reasoning that the claims did not recite or preempt a mathematical alogrithm, the court held that they were statutory.
The court swept aside Paine, Webber's charge that Merrill
Lynch's '442 patent was for a method of doing business. The court
16. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
The specification of the '442 patent discloses a flow chart for practicing the invention. Merrill Lynch cited In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980), for the proposition that it need not disclose a particular apparatus to claim an invention
implemented on a computer in this fashion. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1365.
The reasoning behind this position is that a program effectively reconfigures a
general purpose computer into a machine dedicated to performing a specific task.
The patent specification describes in general terms a method that can be used to program a computer to carry out the invention. Since a general purpose computer can
be programmed with different languages (e.g., Fortran or Pascal) to carry out any one
invention, it is preferable to claim an invention in terms of logical steps that can be
readily translated into a program. This sequence of logical steps is termed an "algorithm." See In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 876 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
17. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1366. In this regard, one court has stated: "LaThough a claim expressed in
bels are not determinative in § 101 inquiries ....
'means for' (functional) terms is said to be an apparatus claim, the subject matter as
a whole of that claim may be distinguishable from that of a method claim drawn to
the steps of the 'means.'" In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (quoting In re
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). Accord In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
18. The court stated: 'The specifications of the '442 patent teach the schematic
flow chart for the [Cash Management Account], but do not include any descriptions
of any apparatus to effectuate the [Cash Management Account]." Paine, Webber, 564
F. Supp. at 1363.
19. Id. at 1368. As will be discussed infra, the Supreme Court has ruled that
claims drawn to mathematical algorithms are not statutory under § 101. Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 632 (1972).
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held that, in view of In re Toma,20 in deciding the patentability of a
computer program under section 101, the analysis should focus on
the steps of the algorithm, rather than on its product (here, a
method of doing business). Concluding that although the method
claimed in the '442 patent would be nonstatutory if carried out with
a paper and pencil, the court said that "the '442 patent claimed statutory subject matter because the claims allegedly teach a method of
operation on a computer to effectuate a business activity." 2 1 This result is significant because it indirectly overcomes a long-standing
22
Patent Office rule against patenting methods of doing business.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PAINE, WEBBER
Sections 101, 102, and 103 of the patent statutes set out the requirements that any invention must satisfy in order to be entitled to
the protection of the patent laws; each section represents a distinct
requirement that must be satisfied. For computer programs, section
101 has been the most significant barrier to patentability. As will be
developed in detail below, a number of courts have held computer
programs unpatentable as not constituting statutory subject matter
under section 101.23 The treatment accorded software in cases in
which the issue of patentability under section 101 has been litigated
is best understood when the development and policy of the patent
system as a whole is considered.
A.

POLICY OF THE PATENT SYSTEM

The patent laws are intended to promote the progress of science
and industry by providing a financial incentive (i.e., exclusive rights
to the invention for a period of seventeen years) to either the inventor or to his assignee. 24 In addition, by establishing this enforceable
right for an inventor, the patent laws promote the free exchange of
ideas. Because of his enforceble monopoly, an inventor need not
fear that making his invention public will deprive him of a financial
reward for his efforts.
20. 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See infra notes 60-65, 93-101 and accompanying
text.
21. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp at 1369.
22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
24. "Every patent shall ... grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the
term of seventeen years ... the right to exclude others from making, selling, or using
the invention throughout the United States ...." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The patent laws were enacted by Congress in accordance with
powers granted by the Constitution: "The Congress shall have the
power... to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
'25
rights to their respective writings and discoveries.
Out of this authority have grown the patent and copyright laws.
The first Patent Act was submitted to the House of Representatives
in the first session of Congress in 1790. President Washington urged
passage of the act, stating: "I cannot forbear intimating to you the
expediency of giving effectual encouragement ... to exertion of
'26
skill and genius in producing new and useful inventions.
In the first revision of the patent laws, in 1793, statutory subject
matter was defined as "any new and useful art, machine, or compo.'
sition of matter or any new or useful improvement [thereofl "27
This may be compared with the present definition of statutory subject matter: "[A]ny new and useful process, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement

thereof ....

"28

There is nothing in the plain language of the Constitution or the
patent laws suggesting an intent to restrict the classes of invention
for which patent protection ought to be available. On the contrary, a
comparison of the original definition of statutory subject matter with
that of the present section 101 demonstrates an intent to broaden
the scope of the patent laws by inclusion of a "process" '29 within the
current definition.

C. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF SOFTWARE
Beginning in 1964, an increasing number of inventors sought
patents for inventions based wholly or in part on computer pro25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

26.
27.
28.
29.
known

Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, at 3 (1954).
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5, 7 (1952).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
"Process" is defined as a "process, art, or method and includes a new use of a
process, machine, manufacture, composition or matter or material." 35 U.S.C.

§ 100(b) (1982).
Although the term "process" was first included in the 1952 revision of the patent
laws, processes have long been recognized as patentable. See O'Reily v. Morse, 56
U.S. (1 How.) 402, 420 (1853) (citing the English case of Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng.
Rep. 1266 (Ex. 1841)); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 503, 505 (1854) ("A process,
eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our act of congress. It is included
under the general term 'useful art.' ").
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grams.30 In 1965, the President's Commission on the Patent System
was formed and charged with, among other things, investigating the
wisdom of granting patents for computer programs. 31 The Commission recommended against this for practical reasons. Since the Patent Office could not properly examine applications for programs
because of the lack of a classification technique, and because of the
tremendous burden of searching the already voluminous prior art,
the patenting of programs would amount to mere registration and
would deny programmers the presumption of validity other inventors enjoyed under the patent system. In addition, patent protection
for software was viewed as unnecessary by the Commission because
of the availability of copyright protection and because of "substan32
tial and satisfactory growth" in the area.
As a result of this study, legislation designed to exclude
software from patent protection was introduced in Congress. However, the legislation was not passed. 33 Regulations excepting program inventions from patent protection were promulgated at the
Patent Office, but were rescinded within a year. 34 Thus, under current regulation and statutory law, computer programs are treated as
any other invention.
1. A Brief History of the Patentabilityof Processes
Computer programs have been viewed as processes 35 by both
the Patent Office and the courts. 36 The courts have struggled with
30. In the first published decision allowing a patent on a software invention, the
Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office held that a computer program
was patentable because it transformed existing hardware into a special purpose device, which was patentable as a new and useful machine. Ex parte King, 146 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 590 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964). See also the cases cited supra notes 16-18.
31. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE ...
USEFUL ARTS (1966).
32. Id. at 13. For a contrary view of the policy reasons for allowing patent protection for software, see Note, An Anomaly in the Patent System: The Uncertain Status
of Computer Software, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 273, 276-280 (1981).
33. H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968).
34. Compare 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609 (1968) (excepting software from patent protection) with 34 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (1969) (in which the Patent Office rescinded its earlier
guidelines and adopted a case-by-case approach).
35. See infra notes 49-83 and accompanying text.
36. The issue of whether a patent claim recites statutory subject matter comes
before a court in one of three ways. First, an inventor may appeal a refusal by an
examiner in the Patent and Trademark Office to issue a patent because an invention
does not recite statutory subject matter. Second, when a patentee sues another party
for infringement, the defendant often counterclaims that the patent in suit is invalid;
one ground for such a counterclaim or affirmative defense is that the patent fails to
recite patentable subject matter. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 402 (1853).
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patent claims for processes because of a policy of limiting an inventor to what he has actually contributed.
O'Reilly v. Morse37 is illustrative. In that case, the Supreme
Court held invalid Samuel Morse's broad claim for "any process
whereby electromagnetism [would be] used for transmitting intelligible signs, characters or letters at a distance. '38 Morse had harnessed the principle of electromagnetism for his invention of the
telegraph, but he was denied a patent claim for then-unenvisioned
uses of the principle.3 9
On the other hand, in the Telephone Cases,4o Alexander Graham
Bell's process patents were held valid because he claimed a particular method of transmitting the human voice with an electric current,
rather than claiming such transmission by any and all means.
A related policy bars patents on scientific principles or laws of
nature. In Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Co. ,41 the Supreme Court
held invalid product claims4 on certain mixed cultures of root nodule bacteria capable of innoculating the seeds of leguminous plants.
Third, a competitor may seek to have a patent held invalid for failure to comply with
§ 101 in a declaratory judgment before he is sued for infringement. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358,
1361 (D. Del. 1983).
In the case of an appeal from a refusal on the part of an examiner to allow patent
claims, a prospective patentee first appeals to the Board of Appeals of the Patent and
Trademark Office ("the Board"). See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1982). An unfavorable decision
by the Board may be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 35
U.S.C. § 141 (1982). Prior to October 1982, such appeals were directed to the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). The final appeal is to the United States
Supreme Court.
37. 56 U.S. (1 How.) 402 (1853).
38. Id. at 111.
39. If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished. For aught that we now know, some future inventor ... may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by means
of the galvanic current without the use of the process or combination set
forth in plaintiff's specification .... [Y]et ... the inventor could not use it
without the permission of the patentee.
Id. at 113.
At issue in O'Reilly was the validity of Morse's patents on his telegraph. Morse
had sued O'Reilly for infringement; invalidity was the latter's defense. Id. at 67.
Morse's first seven claims were held valid, while the eighth, referred to supra, was
stricken as too broad. Id. at 118.
40. 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
41. 333 U.S. 127 (1947).
42. Product patents refer to machines, manufactures or compositions of matter.
In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the Supreme Court equated process and
product patents for the purpose of its inquiry: "We dealt there with a 'product' claim,
while the present case deals with a process' claim. But we think that the same principle applies." Id. at 67-68.
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The Court reasoned that: "He who discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the
law recognizes. If there is an invention to come from such a discovery, it must come from the application of such a law to a useful
43
end."
The policy against allowing patents on scientific principles is
founded on the proposition that the public must not be deprived of
something that it already freely enjoys. 44 One who establishes a scientific principle, or the mathematical expression of it, acknowledges
a relationship that has always existed. Recognition of such a relationship should not entitle one to legal rights in the relationship.
An example of a patentable application of a scientific principle
may be found in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America.45 Here, the patent claims were for a directional antenna
system in which the arrangement of wires was calculated from a
mathematical formula that was itself an expression of a fundamental principle of electromagnetism. The Court said: "While a scientific truth with a mathematical expression of it is not a patentable
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be."'46 By this reasoning, a claim
involving a scientific or mathematical principle (e.g., an equation derived from basic premises) may be patentable so long as the principle is applied to useful ends and is not itself claimed.
The key then appears to be invention. Morse was denied claims
for methods of communication yet undefined. Bell went no further
than his actual contribution and was sustained. In Funk Brothers,
the Court recognized that discovery of a natural phenomenon is not
an invention, while in Mackay Radio, it held that an application of
such a phenomenon is. Stated somewhat differently, "[an idea...
is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is.' 147 The patentability of computer software now appears to depend on similar considerations,4 8 although the evolution
of the present position of the courts has not been straightforward.
2.

Patentsfor Software in the Courts
Programmable digital computers were developed in the 1950s
43. 333 U.S. at 130.
44. ROSENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW § 6.0111] at 6-11 (2d ed. 1982).

45. 306 U.S. 86 (1938).
46. Id. at 94.
47. Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874).
48. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). See also, Note, Algorithm
PatentabilityAfter Diamond v. Diehr, 15 IND. L. REv. 713, 727 (1982) (under the rationale applied in Diehr, the steps of an algorithm are analyzed as a process).
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and came into general usage in the 1960s. Until 1964, 49 applications
for patents on computer programs were routinely denied by the Patent Office on the basis of the "mental steps" doctrine. This doctrine
invalidated claims for processes that required the intervention of
the human mind in the interpretation of data.50 The bar was subsequently broadened to preclude patents on any invention in which
the process included steps that could be carried out mentally and
52
was applied to computer programs. 51 In Prater,
the C.C.P.A. reversed this rule, holding that only inventions that required mental
steps should be disallowed. Thereafter the C.C.P.A. took a liberal
stance with regard to the patentability of computer programs under
53
section 101.
In view of the Patent Office's opposition to permitting patents
on software, 54 it is not surprising that the Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks sought to have the C.C.P.A. reversed. The
Supreme Court provided this reversal in 1972, in Gottschalk v.
Benson .55

In Benson, the applicants sought a patent for a method of converting data in binary-coded-decimal format to absolute binary. A
denial of two of the broad claims by the Patent Office had been reversed by the C.C.P.A.56 The Supreme Court in turn reversed the
C.C.P.A., affirming the rejection of the patent by the Patent Office.
49. See supra note 30.
50. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 169-70 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
51. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1381 (C.C.P.A. 1968). See also In re Prater, 415 F.2d
1393, 1403 (reversing the Board's earlier decision as to claim 10, affirming the decisions on all other claims).
52. In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1389.
53. The C.C.P.A. stated: "All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence
of operational steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it might be in
the technological arts .... " In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 881, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). But
see In re Musgrave at 895-96 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
54. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Some of the large computer manufacturing firms opposed granting patents for software inventions. In re Johnston, 502
F.2d 765, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Rich, J., dissenting).
A patent offers a small business the protection of a legal monopoly during which
time it can establish itself, and attempt to generate the wherewithal to withstand
competition in the open market. The patent system thus fosters competition. Thus, it
is not surprising that established firms sought to foreclose one route by which newcomers might establish a toehold in the software market. Brief Amicus Curiae of Applied Data Research Inc. and Whitlow Computer Systems at 4, Diamond v. Bradley,
450 U.S. 381 (1981).
Manufacturers of electronic components also opposed software patents on the
grounds that they could be excluded from the microcomputer market. Brief Amicus
Curiae of National Semiconductor at 2, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
55. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
56. See In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous court, held that a mathematical algorithm, like an idea or fundamental scientific truth, could
not be patented. 57 The fact that the method was limited to being
practiced on a computer was of no significance for analysis of patentability under section 101.58
Following Benson, in Freeman, the C.C.P.A. developed a twostep test for patent claims reciting computer programs:
1. Each claim is examined to determine if it recites a mathematical algorithm.
2. If it does, it must be determined
if a claim in its entirety would
59
wholly preempt the algorithm.
Claims were denied if both questions were answered affirmatively.
For the C.C.P.A., the major impact of the Benson decision appeared to be preclusion of patent protection for programs that
claimed mathematical algorithms. Hence, a claim for a computer
57. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
58. Justice Douglas summarized the opinion in what has come to be known as
the nutshell holding: "The mathematical algorithm involved here has no substantial
application except in connnection with a digital computer, which means that if the
judgment below is affirmed the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula, and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself." Id. at 72.
Although the Court correctly summarized existing precedents in formulating the
rule that a mathematical algorithm could not be patented, the Court incorrectly applied the rule. The disputed claims recite not a mathematical algorithm or formula,
but a process carried out by a particular kind of hardware within a computer. Claim 8
is representative of the claims:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into
binary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is
a binary '1 in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary '1' in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1'
to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a succeeding binary '1' in the second position of said register.
Id. at 73.
59. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The claims in Freeman
were for a computerized typesetting system. The C.C.P.A. reasoned that because the
claim elements did not include a mathematical algorithm, the claims should not be
rejected under the rule of Gottschalk v. Benson. The C.C.P.A. was careful to distinguish mathematical algorithms from computer algorithms, the latter being a more
general term. The court said: "Because every process can be characterized as a
'step-by-step procedure ... for accomplishing some end,' a refusal to recognize that
Benson was concerned with mathematical alogrithms leads to the absurd view that
the Court was reading the word 'process' out of the statute." In re Freeman, 537 F.2d
at 1246.
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program that did not recite such an algorithm would appear to be
statutory under the C.C.P.A.'s interpretation of the Benson decision.
This issue was squarely presented to the C.C.P.A. in In re
Toma. 60 The claimed invention was a program for translating between natural languages (Russian and English), which did not involve a mathematical algorithm. The Patent Office refused the
patent application, relying on a broad definition of the term "algorithm": "A fixed, step-by-step procedure for accomplishing a
-61 The Patent Office reasoned that if a patent
given result ....
claim recited such an algorithm, and if it was the62only novelty present in the claim, then Benson required rejection.
The C.C.P.A. reversed, explicitly rejecting the broad definition
of the term "algorithm," holding that Benson required the term to be
applied in a specific sense, only to a solution of a given type of mathematical problem. 6 3 The court effectively confined the holding in
Benson to claims reciting mathematical algorithms. This limitation
is not required by either the rationale or holding in Benson. 64 It is
illustrative of the tension that exists between the decisions of the
65
Supreme Court and the C.C.P.A. in the area of computer software.
Even though a claim drawn to a mathematical algorithm is nonstatutory under Benson, the decision in Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co. v. Radio Corp. of America 66 would seem to indicate that a practical application of such an algorithm should be patentable. In
Parkerv. Flook,67 this issue was before the Supreme Court.
60. 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See also In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A.
1978). The Patent Office continued to maintain that Benson applied to all computer
algorithms. See, e.g., In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The issue was apparently resolved in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 n.9 (1981), in favor of the position
advocated by the C.C.P.A.; see Nimtz, Diamond v. Diehr: A Turning Point, 8 RUTGERS
J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 267, 270 (1981).
61. 575 F.2d at 876, n.4.
62. Id. at 876.
63. "[Ilt is clear to us that the Benson Court used the term 'algorithm' in a specific sense, namely 'a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem.'"
Id. at 877 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972)) (emphasis added).
64. Although the "nutshell holding," supra note 58, is confined to mathematical
algorithms, the bulk of the opinion is written in broader language. The Court rested
its holding in general on the principle that one may not obtain a patent for an idea or
for a law of nature. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
65. Compare In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970) with Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). See also In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (Rich,
J., dissenting); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 205 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the C.C.P.A.'s interpretation of the opinion in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978), as "trivializing").
66. 306 U.S. 86 (1938). See supra text accompanying note 45.
67. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
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Flook involved an applicant who had devised a mathematical algorithm for a particular application: control of a catalytic process for
refining petroleum. The patent claims were carefully worded so as
not to pre-empt the claimed algorithm. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court held that a method for calculating a number, even when tied
to a specific end use, was unpatentable subject matter under section
101.68 This was an expansion of the rule in Benson, because the
claims in Flook were made in the context of another process that
was otherwise statutory. 69 The Supreme Court went further, holding that a program was unpatentable if the only novelty in the
70
claims resided in a mathematical algorithm.
The C.C.P.A. attempted to limit the scope of the Flook holding
since requiring a determination of whether or not an invention comprised statutory subject matter by separating the new aspects of the
invention from the algorithm would severely limit the scope of the
patent system. 7' For example, the C.C.P.A. held that the proper interpretation of Flook was a requirement that the claim as a whole
not be directed toward the solution of a mathematical problem in In
re Walter. 72 The case utilized the two-step test formulated in Freeman 73 for patent claims involving computer programs. The second
step of the Freeman test required only that a claimed mathematical
algorithm not have a pre-emptive effect. That is to say, the algorithm could not be claimed for all applications. Flook clearly imposed further limitations. As a result, the C.C.P.A. used In re
68. Id. at 589.
69. This result is clearly at odds with the Court's decisions in the Telephone
Cases, 126 U.S. 584 (1887), and MacKay Radio, 306 U.S. 86 (1938).
70. "Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a
mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that component is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no
patentable invention." Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
The difficulty with this portion of the majority opinion is that it mixes the requirements of § 101 with that of § 102, which sets out the standard for novelty. The
dissent in Flook objected to this confusion of the § 101 and § 102 issues. Flook 437
U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The commentators have also been critical of this
"point of novelty" analysis applied by the majority to the claims in Flook. See, e.g.,
Flewellyn, An Anomaly in the Patent System: The Uncertain Status of Computer
Software, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 273, 292 (1981).
This holding is a further illustration of the tension between the C.C.P.A. and the
Supreme Court. The C.C.P.A. has criticized a "point of novelty approach to patent
claims as neither correct nor within the intent of Congress." In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d
1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
71. "If a point of novelty approach were to be adopted it would immeasurably debilitate the patent system. We do not believe the Supreme Court acted in a manner
so potentially destructive." In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
72. Id.
73. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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Walter to modify the second step of the Freeman test to require
that a mathematical algorithm, to be statutory, "define structural relationships between physical elements of the claim (in apparatus
,,74
claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process claims) ....
However, in a later case, the Patent Office contended that this
narrow reading of Flook gutted the opinion. 75 The claimed invention
in Diamond v. Diehr76 involved the use of a digital computer to adjust the cure time in the molding of synthetic rubber. The computer
was required to repeatedly solve a well-known equation 77 at fixed
intervals using temperature data from the mold in order to predict
optimal cure time. In the majority opinion, the invention was perceived as an improvement in the process for curing synthetic rubber. The involvement of a computer program was viewed as
78
incidental to the claimed process.
Relying on Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America,79 the Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory because it
uses a mathematical formula, a computer program or digital computer."80 The Supreme Court explained that "when a claim stating a
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a
function which the patent laws were designed to protect . . . then
the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101."81 The majority in
Diehr appears to have adopted the position of the C.C.P.A. in In re
Walter, focusing on the invention as a whole, and rejecting the
Flook approach.
Following Diehr, the C.C.P.A. considerably relaxed the requirements of the second prong of its two-step Freeman/Waltertest, but
82
has adhered to its basic bipartite form.
74. In re Walter, 618 F.2d at 766.
75. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
76. Id.
77. The Arrhenius equation. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177 n.2.
78. "We view respondent's claims as nothing more than a process for molding
rubber ..
" Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. But see id. at 210 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that application of the Flook analysis to the claims would find them unpatentable under § 101).
79. 306 U.S. 86 (1938). See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
80. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
81. Id. at 192.
82. Apparently, limiting a claim including a mathematical algorithm that would
otherwise be statutory would meet the requirements of § 101. See In re Abele, 681
F.2d 787, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ('The goal is to answer the question 'What did applicants
invent?'. . . If the claimed invention is an application of the algorithm, § 101 will not
bar the grant of a patent."). See Milde, Life After Diamond v. Diehr. The C.C.P.A.
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Although the Supreme Court has now held at least some
software inventions patentable under section 101, uncertainty
prevails. There is no clear standard for analyzing patent claims.
The C.C.P.A., until it was replaced by the C.A.F.C., adhered to the
two-step analysis reserved for software, whereas the Supreme Court
has consistently applied a more general analysis.
The common thread running through the decisions is that
claims drawn to nonstatutory subject matter, such as mathematical
formulae, must be limited to hardware to be valid. But the requisite
degree of restriction is unsettled.
With the appointment of Justice O'Connor, the narrow majority
of Diehr may have disappeared. 83 In addition, the combining of the
C.C.P.A. and the Court of Claims into the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit may produce a shift in the position of this appellate
panel on software cases.
Whatever the differences in the tests applied by the courts in
deciding section 101 cases, it is settled law that an analysis must
consider what function the claimed algorithm performs. It is here
that the Paine, Webber court seemingly erred.
III.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PAINE, WEBBER

The test applied to the claims in Paine, Webber was simply to
determine whether or not a mathematical algorithm was recited in
the patent claims. Not finding such an algorithm, the court held the
claims statutory. 84 The apparent problems with this test are twofold. First, no appellate court has ever concluded that all processes
not containing mathematical algorithms become statutory when
claimed as computer programs or algorithms. 85 As the preceding
section demonstrates, the analysis is usually carried out the other
Speaks Out on the Patentability of Computer Related Subject Matter, J. PAT. OFF.

Soc'y 434 (1982), for a discussion of post-Diehr cases.
83. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (5-4 decision).
84. The Court summarized the test it applied:
The product of the claims of the '442 patent effectuates a highly useful business method and would be unpatentable if done by hand. The C.C.P.A., however, has made clear that if no Benson algorithm exists, the product of a
computer program is irrelevant, and the focus of analysis should be on the
operation of the program on the computer. The Court finds that the '442 patent claims statutory subject matter because the claims allegedly teach a
method of operation on a computer to effectuate a business activity.
Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1369.
The court apparently ignored the plain meaning of its own language, since there
is no analysis in the opinion concerning the "operation of the program on the
computer."
85. See In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Phillipps, 608 F.2d 879
(C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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way around: an algorithm is statutory only when the process it embodies is statutory.8 6 Second, the test ignores the rationale for many
of the prior decisions in the software area; the test is simply too
87
superficial.
This analysis will begin by critically examining the reasoning
and precedents used by the Paine, Webber court. Next, an alternate
analysis will b& applied, utilizing a modified version of the C.C.P.A.'s
two-step test. The policy questions raised by the '442 patent litigation will also be considered.

A. THE COuRT'S ANALYSIS
The Paine, Webber court read the Supreme Court decisions in
Benson and Diehr, as those cases were interpreted by the C.C.P.A.,
establishing two broad classes of algorithms: as mathematical algorithms and computer algorithms. 88 Since it was unable to find any
procedure for solving a mathematical problem in the '442 patent, the
court ruled that the '442 patent was outside of the special area identified by the precedents. 89 The court then apparently relied on In re
Toma 90 for the proposition that a computer program for a
nonmathematical process is in the "technological arts" and is, therefore, statutory under section 101. 9 1 The problem with the court's
analysis is that the process embodied by the claimed computer program is thereby made irrelevant, a result decidedly at odds with the
92
decisional law.
86. The court in In re Walter, 618 F.2d 767, 769 (C.C.P.A. 1980), stated that the fact
that a computer might utilize arithmetic steps in its internal operations while executing a process is irrelevant in determining whether or not claimed mathematical operations themselves are statutory. See also In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 812 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Because of the equivalence of the terms algorithm and process, the approach
used in a § 101 analysis is to determine whether or not the elements of a claimed step
comply with the statute.
87. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (criticizing the Board
for failing to analyze the steps of the claimed algorithm for compliance with § 101); In
re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 874 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (emphasizing that the claimed process of
translation between languages as implemented by computer differs markedly from
the process of translation as carried out by humans).
88. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1366-68, citing In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Phillips, 608 F.2d 879 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
89. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1369.
90. 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
91. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1369. See also supra note 84.
92. Compare what the Paine, Webber court stated supra note 84 (method claims
that would be unpatentable if done by hand become patentable when implemented
on computer) with In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (if an inventor im-
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1. The Meaning of Toma
In Toma, the Patent Office objected to the claims because translation between languages was a "liberal art," rather than a techno93
logical one.
The origin of the language on which the Patent Office relied in
making its rejection is found in several earlier cases. The C.C.P.A.
ruled in In re Musgrave that the only requirement for a computer
program to be patentable under section 101 was that it be "in the
technological arts. ' 94 The requirement of statutory subject matter
virtually disappeared. Judge Baldwin, in a separate concurrence in
Musgrave, foresaw the difficulty with this ill-defined section 101 requirement. 95 He urged instead that the analysis of the computer re96
lated inventions be carried out using the traditional process tests.
by the Supreme
Judge Baldwin's approach was ultimately adopted 97
Court and the technological arts test was forgotten.
Any doubt as to the fate of the technological arts test was put to
rest in Toma when Judge Baldwin wrote that the test was "not intended to create a generalized definition of statutory subject matter."98 Judge Baldwin's view of the technological arts issue is that
an invention is not statutory if it is not within the technological or
useful arts. But if an invention is within the technological arts, it is
not exempted from further analysis. 99
In overruling the technological arts objection, the Toma court
discussed factors it considered important in deciding if an invention
was within the technological arts. The court stressed that the focus
of the inquiry should be on the method by which translation between languages was accomplished, rather than on the results of
that translation. 100 In other words, the court held that in deciding
proves a process or method, his invention is statutory, if the underlying subject matter that has been improved is itself statutory).
93. 575 F.2d 872, 877 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
94. 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The language is ultimately derived from the
Constitutional mandate for a patent system.
95. Id. at 895 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 894-95 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
97. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
98. In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. [W]e hold that the method for enabling a computer to translate natural
languages is in the technological arts, i.e., it is a method of operating a
machine. The "technological" or "useful" arts inquiry must focus on whether
the claimed subject matter (a method of operating a machine to translate) is
statutory, not on whether the product of the claimed subject matter (a translated text) is statutory, not on whether the prior art which the claimed sub-
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upon compliance with section 101, the focus of the inquiry should be
on the steps of the claimed process. The opinion in Toma is thus
seen to be consistent with other computer cases that have been
before the C.C.P.A.10 1 The question in determining compliance with
section 101 is whether or not the steps of the claimed process are
statutory. The technological arts test is not a means to avoid this
crucial issue.
2.

Problems with the Paine, Webber Test

The test applied in Paine,Webber appears to avoid consideration
of the steps of the claimed process. The court did not analyze the
elements of the claims except to determine that mathematical algorithms had not been recited. 10 2 To be statutory under section 101, it
was sufficient that the claims were for a nonmathematical computer
algorithm, without determining whether or not the claimed steps
constituted a statutory process. 10 3 It is for this reason that the
court's analysis of the claims was faulty. The position of the
C.C.P.A. is clear: "While a program may configure a computer in a
manner to carry out a process, it is the process, i.e., what the computer does, which is the subject of examination under 35 U.S.C. § 101
4 The Supreme Court has taken a similar position in the
....
10 5
computer cases it has decided.
Because of the superficial test applied to the claims of the '442
patent, the Paine,Webber court avoided confronting the crucial issue
of whether or not a claim drawn to a method of doing business is
patentable under section 101.
ject matter purports to replace (translation by the human mind) is statutory
Id. at 877.
101. See cases cited supra note 85.
102. Paine, Webber, 564 F. Supp. at 1368-69.
103. If the Paine, Webber court correctly stated the law, then any process implemented on a computer, except one claiming a mathematical formula, is statutory
under § 101. This would constitute a virtual return to the standard announced in In
re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1974). This is a difficult position to defend in
view of the language in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("This Court has
undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 .. .. Excluded from such patent protection
are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."). See also In re Meyer,
688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (affirming rejection of computer algorithm embodying a
mental process).
104. In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 37 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
105. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981).
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AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYsis

The most recent formulation of the C.C.P.A. two-step test is
stated as follows:
[Ilt must be determined whether a scientific principle, law of nature, idea, or mental process, which may be represented by a mathematical algorithm, is included in the subject matter of the claim. If
it is, it must then be determined whether such principle, law, idea,
or mental process is applied in an invention of a type set forth in 35
U.S.C. § 101.106

This test captures the Supreme Court holdings in the computer
cases establishing that a patentee may not claim a mathematical algorithm, but may claim an otherwise statutory process that requires
a mathematical step. The test also broadens the first prong of the
test to include nonstatutory processes besides mathematical
algorithms.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a computer program is to be analyzed, using the same approach as would be applied to any other claimed process. 10 7 For example, the
mathematical algorithm exception announced in Gottschalk v. Benson was not a special case, but an application of the rule that one
may not patent a law of nature. 10 8 As a result, it would be in keeping with the Supreme Court's rulings to further expand the scope of
the first step of the C.C.P.A.'s two-step test by striking out the refer10 9
Thus, the
ence to mathematical algorithms in the first sentence.
not any
or
whether
determine
first,
reformulated:
be
should
test
detersecond,
claims;
the
in
is
recited
matter
subject
nonstatutory
mine whether or not such nonstatutory subject matter is applied in
an invention of the type set forth in section 101.
This test would explicitly preserve all judicially created exceptions to section 101 unless the reason for their existence was eliminated by limitations included in the language of the claim. For
example, claims reciting mathematical algorithms are patentable
provided that they are limited to application of the claimed formula
in a concrete invention. Unfortunately, what constitutes an adequate limitation is still unclear." 0
106. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
107. See cases cited supra note 105.
108. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
110. Compare Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (stating that "the notion that
post solution activity ... can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process exalts form over substance") with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)
(holding that application of a similar formula to a similar process, i.e., limiting the
time of a chemical reaction by way of sensor data fed back to a controlling computer,
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In applying this modified two-step test to the claims at issue in
Paine,Webber, the threshold question is whether or not the claims
come within the scope of the test."' In order for a claimed process
11 2
it
to come within the "methods of doing business" exception,
113
must merely facilitate business dealings.
In evaluating the '442
claims, the Paine, Webber court stated that the product of the claims
of the '442 patent would be unpatentable if done by hand, implying
that the claims, if expressed as a general method, would fall within
the exception. Examination of the claim language reveals that the
claimed invention would be such a method but for the inclusion of
the limiting words "means for." 1 4 Since this limitation has little
significance in the case of an invention embodied as a computer program, however, the claims of the '442 patent should be analyzed as a
5
method for doing business and not as an apparatus claim."
Assuming, arguendo, that the claims of the '442 patent fall
within this judicially created exception to section 101, thus failing
the first prong of the proposed test, then, to be patentable, the
claims must be limited to avoid the problem that motivated the creation of the exception in the first place. In the case of mathematical
formulas, for example, the claims must be limited to a concrete statutory application, in order to avoid monopolizing the formula itwas statutory under § 101). See e.g.,
Milde, Life After Diamond v. Diehr: The C.C.P.A.
Speaks Out on the Patentability of Computer Related Subject Matter, J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 434, 437 (1982). In a recent opinion, however, the C.C.P.A. held that if, absent
the mathematical algorithm, a claim was statutory, then the presence of an element
drawn to such an algorithm would not render the claim unpatentable. See In re
Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
111. See In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("Any process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter constitutes statutory subject matter unless it
falls within a judicially determined exception to § 101.").
112. There is no clear precedent holding methods of doing business unpatentable,
although this "non-exception" is well recognized, In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 771
(C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Duetsch, 553 F.2d 689, 692 n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1977). See also supra
notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
113. In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1934).
114. See, e.g., supra note 14.
115. "If the functionally-defined disclosed means and their equivalents are so
broad that they encompass any and every means for performing the recited functions, the apparatus claim is an attempt to exalt form over substance since the claim
is really to the method . . ."In re Walter 618 F.2d 758, 768 (C.C.P.A. 1980). See also
supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. The claim language of the '442 patent is
sufficiently broad to cover the invention if it were implemented by hand, except for
the "means for" limitation. But see In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (data
processing system for record keeping associated with banking transactions not a
method of doing business), rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (system held unpatentable on grounds of obviousness).
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self. 116 In the case of methods of doing business, the policy behind
the exception is that such a method is merely an idea, and an idea,
by itself, is not patentable. 117 A second ground for the exception is
that "a system of business, disconnected from means for carrying
out the system ... is not an art,"" 8 implying that such a system is
not one of the "useful arts" that the patent laws were mandated by
the Constitution to protect.
Clearly, restricting the '442 patent claims to a computer-based
implementation could meet either objection. Unfortunately, the
claim language does not sufficiently restrict the claimed invention.
The only reference to a computer or to digital data processing may
be found in the patent specification. The claims are limited only by
"means for" language. In view of the C.C.P.A.'s interpretation of
"means for" language in software related inventions, it is unlikely
that this is adequate. 119 In the case of the '442 patent, although the
invention itself is statutory, the claims are drafted too broadly to
comply with the statute. Accordingly, the court erred in finding the
claims patentable under section 101.
It is instructive to apply this analysis to the claims in In re
Toma.120 Again, the threshold question is whether or not the claims
come within the scope of the proposed two-step test. In other
words, do the claims fail part one of the test?
116. See In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
117. Loew's Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (lst Cir.
1949); accord, Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908).
118. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908).
See also Berardini v. Tocci, 190 F. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
119. See supra note 115.
120. In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Claim 1 is reproduced here as
exemplary.
A method for translation between source and target natural languages using
a programmable digital computer system, the steps comprising:
(a) storing in the main memory of the computer a source text to be
translated;
(b) scanning and comparing such source text with dictionaries of source language words stored in a memory and for each source text word for which a
match is found, storing in a file main memory each word and in association
with each such word, the coded information including memory offset linkages
to a memory in the computer system where grammar and target language
translations for the word are stored;
(c) analyzing the source text words, in its file of words, a complete sentence
at a time, and converting the same into a sentence in the target language
utilizing the coded information and including the steps of
(1) utilizing the memory offset address linkages for obtaining the target
translations of words from a memory; and
(2) reordering the target language translation into the proper target language sequence.
Id. at 875.
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The Patent Office rejected the claims in Toma partly because
translation between languages was held not to be in the technological arts. 12 1 The preamble to claim 1 is unequivocal: "[a] method for
translating between source and target natural languages ....
Thus, if it is assumed for this discussion that methods for translating between languages are nonstatutory because translation is not
in the technological arts, then clearly the claims in Toma read on
nonstatutory material. Of course, it might be pertinent to observe
that the "technological arts" have not been defined specifically,
either by statute 123 or judicial opinion. 124 Even conceding that
translation between languages is nonstatutory, the claims at issue in
Toma are statutory under section 101 because they satisfy the second step of the test: 25 the claims are explicitly restricted to a
method for enabling a computer to carry out translation. Moreover,
the elements of claim 1, which consist of storing, scanning, and analyzing, can only be read to claim a method whereby a machine carries out the translation. Since section 100(b)' 26 defines a statutory
process to be a method for operating a machine, it is clear that the
claims in Toma fall within the definition of statutory subject matter.
The analysis by the Patent Office is somewhat different from
that used by the C.C.P.A. in Toma. The C.C.P.A. first held that the
claims were not objectionable because no mathematical algorithm
was claimed. 27 It then rejected the technological arts objection,
holding that the claims were drawn to a process that was within the
technological arts because it was "for a method of operating a
machine to translate."' 28 The Toma court thus never considered
whether or not a method for translation of languages was nonstatutory; it proceeded directly to the second issue, whether or not such a
method, limited to computer applications, was statutory. 129 The
only category of nonstatutory subject matter that the Toma court referred to was that of mathematical algorithms, condemned by the
121. Id. at 877.
122. Id.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) defines patentable subject matter as "any new and useful process."
124. See, e.g., In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1971).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 106-110.
126. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1982).
127. Toma, 875 F.2d at 877.
128. Id.
129. The court avoided this issue by distinguishing between the product of the algorithm (translation between languages) and the claimed steps. Id.
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Supreme Court in Benson.130 The proposed analysis is both simpler
and more logical.
Significantly, this analysis suggests that processes previously
held unpatentable because they involved mental processes, or because the claimed steps were not restricted to particular implementations, should now be patentable, if the claimed processes are
restricted to operation on a computer. This result could considerably broaden the scope of patentable subject matter.
CONCLUSION
There is strong reason to believe that the Paine, Webber court
applied an incorrect test for compliance with section 101 to the
claims. As a result of its incomplete analysis, the court failed to confront the fundamental issues of the case. A better analytic alternative is that applied by the C.C.P.A. in computer cases, which with
slight modification should be applied to the claims of the '442 patent.
The improved result for such claims would be a nonstatutory status
under section 101.
David J. Meyer*

130. It may be that this approach is an attempt to confine the impact of the Benson
and Flook decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 60-74.
* Student, University of California, Los Angeles Law School; Law Clerk, Christie, Parker & Hale, Pasadena, California.

